But AB 645 is designed to punish and deter rather than compensate, which creates a genuine constitutional vulnerability under California's Article I, Section 16 jury trial guarantee.
The structural problem is that revenue goes to program costs and traffic calming, not to anyone harmed by speeding, which makes the fines punitive in character under any substance-over-label analysis.
The lack of DMV points and criminal record weakens the argument somewhat, but under California's substance-over-label approach those omissions aren't dispositive. They merely show the legislature knew how to stay on the civil side of the line, not necessarily that it succeeded.
If a court finds the penalties punitive in character, the owner-liability structure becomes a compounding problem: California's state due process protections are arguably more robust than federal, and imposing a punitive fine on a registered owner without proof they were driving, while burden-shifting exculpation to them looks increasingly difficult to sustain.
Everything you've said applies to parking tickets too. You can't prove that the owner parked the vehicle.
Tha owner is ultimately civily liable if the vehicle is parked in a way that it shouldn't be. Extending that same civil liability to the active operation, as opposed to only the consequences of active operation, seems perfectly reasonable.
> Tha owner is ultimately civily liable if the vehicle is parked in a way that it shouldn't be. Extending that same civil liability to the active operation, as opposed to only the consequences of active operation, seems perfectly reasonable.
As this judgement reveals, such a suggestion is patently unreasonable, for the reasons listed in the judgement
Having read the order, it doesn't really justify the central claim, that these are criminal, and in my opinion a lot of the context cuts against that (the liability being only a fine and some other things).
That is a fair view to hold as a prior. Indeed, the judge took that context into account when judging that it was a criminal matter. Other states which do things differently might have received a different judgement based on their own context.
Also, the "why it matters" and bullet lists that directly follow it. But I think this post was hand written to some extent then fed to AI for "polishing it up"
How does the Supreme Court’s elimination of Chevron deference affect USCIS’s ability to narrowly interpret the EB-1A regulatory framework, particularly at Step 1 of the Kazarian analysis? I am specifically interested in two areas: (1) whether, under a strict textual reading of the judging the work of others criterion in 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(3), participation in code review where the beneficiary evaluates and approves the technical work of others in the same field should qualify without USCIS applying extra regulatory limitations, and (2) whether USCIS can continue using its historically restrictive approach to comparable evidence under 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(h)(4) now that courts are no longer required to defer to agency interpretations. I understand that even if these issues favor the petitioner at Step 1 they may not change the outcome of the final merits determination under Step 2, and I am trying to determine how a post Chevron, strictly textual approach might influence Step 1 outcomes for petitioners whose achievements do not align neatly with the ten listed criteria.
What has Chevron got to do with EB-1A adjudication? The Kazarian step 1 step 2 stuff is hokey. It is ultimately a subjective evaluation that will remain under the executive.
But this isn't an ambiguous area of law. The statute is pretty clear in the text here - that the EB1-A criteria are necessary but not sufficient. That's what the step1 (necessary) and step2 (sufficient) boil down to. You can litigate on what qualifies as necessary if the agency is doing something weird, but ultimately it is a subjective evaluation. The court isn't going to adjudicate on the merits, USCIS is.
