What would a physical token give you that totp doesn't?

Edit: wait, did the attacker intercept the totp code as it was entered? Trying to make sense of the thread

The attacker installed a RAT on the contributor’s machine, so if they had configured TOTP or saved the recovery codes anywhere on that machine, the attacker could defeat 2FA.

Oh, yes, I missed that the TOTP machine was compromised:\ Would that then imply that it would have been okay if codes came from a separate device, eg. a TOTP app on a Palm OS device with zero network connectivity? (Or maybe these days the easiest airgapped option is an old android phone that stays in airplane mode...)

The easiest approach is a provider-issued hardware dongle like a SecurID or Yubikey. Lack of end-user programmability is a feature, not a bug.

> Lack of end-user programmability is a feature, not a bug.

I would argue that the problem is network accessibility, not programmability.

When designing a system for secure attestation, end-user programmability is not a feature.

It would not be an advantage for your front door lock to be infinitely reprogrammable. It’s just a liability.

I mean, I guess attestation might have some value, but it feels like moving the goalposts. Under the threat model of a remote attacker who can compromise a normal networked computer, I can't think of an attack that would succeed with a programmable TOTP code generator that would fail if that code generator was not reprogrammable. Can you?

> It would not be an advantage for your front door lock to be infinitely reprogrammable. It’s just a liability.

Er, most door locks are infinitely reprogrammable, because being able to rekey them without having to replace the whole unit is a huge advantage and the liability/disadvantage is minimal (falling under "It rather involved being on the other side of this airtight hatchway" in an unusually almost-literal sense where you have to be inside the house in order to rekey the lock, at which point you could also do anything else).

Sorry, attestation is the goalpost. The community wants certainty that the package was published by a human with authority, and not just by someone who had access to an authority’s private keys. That is what distinguishes attestation from authentication or authorization.

Yes, unfortunately authenticator apps just generate TOTP codes based on a binary key sitting in plain sight without any encryption. Not that it would help if the encrypting/decrypting machine is pwned.