If your threat model is state-sponsored then I hope for your sake you're just LARPing, because if not you're in for a bad time with some of the solutions you advocate.

This is just a shallow dismissal. I'm sure state actors can break into my phone. I'm also sure that they can't track or record me when kill switches are off (unless there is another device nearby). Tell me why I'm wrong and please stop repeating how surprised you are that people are so very stupid.

For kill switches on a device with otherwise comparatively abysmal security to be the better security choice over a device with thorough and comprehensive security paired with OS-level radio and sensor switches, you would have to demonstrate that the infinitely more vulnerable device's physical kill switches are somehow significantly more effective at addressing your threat model than software switches in a trustworthy OS. If they are approximately equally effective then you have given up a lot for no benefit, and are net much worse off.

Again, I get the human factors appeal of physical kill switches, and if all else were equal they may be worth having, but people are place far too much faith in the value of physical kill switches.

> For kill switches on a device with otherwise comparatively abysmal security to be the better security choice

Same strawman as earlier: I already replied that I never said that Librem 5 was more secure. At least you accepted that the kill switches do work, so there is progress.

> If they are approximately equally effective then you have given up a lot for no benefit, and are net much worse off.

(I won't claim they are, but) there is another benefit in freedom, apart from the security. Some people care about freedom. When I see that, I suggest Librem 5 in my replies, and not as a more secure solution. Maybe you should read my replies more carefully before answering.